Devising a trust model for multi-agent interactions using confidence and reputation by Ramchurn, Sarvapali et al.




SARVAPALI D. RAMCHURN and
NICHOLAS R. JENNINGS
School of Electronics and Computer Science,




Artificial Intelligence Research Institute,
Bellaterra, Spain
In open environments in which autonomous agents can break contracts, computational mod-
els of trust have an important role to play in determining who to interact with and how inter-
actions unfold. To this end, we develop such a trust model, based on confidence and
reputation, and show how it can be concretely applied, using fuzzy sets, to guide agents in
evaluating past interactions and in establishing new contracts with one another.
Agents generally interact by engaging in some form of negotiation process
which results in them making commitments to (contracts with) one another
to carry out particular tasks (Jennings et al. 2001). However, in most realistic
environments, there is no guarantee that a contracted agent will actually
enact its commitments (because it may defect to gain higher utility or because
there is uncertainty about whether the task can actually be achieved). In such
situations, computational models of trust (here defined as the positive expec-
tation that an interaction partner will act benignly and cooperatively in situa-
tions where defecting would prove more profitable to itself [Dasgupta 1998])
have an important role to play. First, to help determine the most reliable
interaction partner (i.e., those in which the agent has the highest trust).
Second, to influence the interaction process itself (e.g., an agent’s negotiation
stance may vary according to the opponent’s trust level). Third, to define the
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833set of issues that need to be settled in the contract (i.e., the higher the trust,
the more that can be left implicit in the contract).
Generally speaking, agent interactions go through three main phases: (i) a
negotiation dialogue during which the terms of the contract are agreed upon
and agents assign an expected utility to the contract, (ii) an execution phase dur-
ing which there are opportunities for the contracted agent to defect, and (iii) an
outcome evaluation phase where the client agent assesses the outcome of the task
and finally derives some utility. In the cases where an agent has an incentive to
defect, the client agent can judge whether the contractor is trustworthy by asses-
sing its performance, relative to the initially contracted agreement, given its
perception of the contract and the context. Thus, the trust value for a specific
agent for a specific task needs to take into account the potential utility loss or
risk
1 (associated with the task in question) in a contract given information about
the context in which the contract is enacted (Marsh 1994). This follows from the
fact that cooperating under high potential losses shows greater trustworthiness
than otherwise (Yamagishi et al. 1998).
Trust values, thus devised, can guide future contract negotiations in order to
ensure that guarantees are provided against losses. Thus, if trust is sufficiently
high, the contracted agent is deemed reliable. This means less time can be spent
looking for potential contractors, negotiating about the minute guarantees
present in the contract and, accordingly, giving more freedom to the contracted
agent to enact its part of the deal. Conversely, when trust is low, the agents may
spendasignificanttimespecifyingtheguaranteesassociatedwithacontractor,if
possible, avoiding future interactions with such agents.
Given this background, a number of computational models of trust have
been developed (see [Ramchurn et al. 2004] for more details). In Marsh
(1994) for example, trust is taken to be a value between  1 and 1 that is cal-
culated by taking into account risk in the interaction and the competence
level of an interaction partner. However, the calculation of risk is not given
and the model does not take into account past experience and reputation
values of the contracted agent. In Sabater and Sierra (2002), reputation sym-
bolizes trust and competence levels are gathered from the social network in
which the agents are embedded. The main value of this model lies in showing
how reputation can be used to guide an agent’s negotiation stance, but the
evaluation of direct interactions is overly simple (disregarding the context).
In general, extant trust models fail to capture the individuality of an
agent in assessing the reliability of an interaction partner. Most models also
neglect the fact that agents interact according to the norms and conventions
determined by the society or environment within which they are situated
(Esteva et al. 2001). To this end, this paper develops a computational model
of trust that rectifies these shortcomings.
By taking into account its past experience (from direct interactions) and
information gathered from other agents (indirect interactions), an agent can
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meeting the expected outcomes of particular contract issues (e.g., delivering
goods on time or delivering high quality goods). In this respect, we conceive
of two ways of assessing trustworthiness: (i) confidence derived (mainly) from
analyzing the result of previous interactions with that agent and (ii) reputation
acquired from the experiences of other agents in the community through
gossip or by analyzing signals sent by an agent. Both measure the same pro-
perty; that is, the agent’sbelieved reliability in doing whatit says it will regard-
ing particular issues of a contract. Here these measures are modeled using
fuzzy sets to give agents a robust means of assessing the extent to which their
interaction partners satisfy the issues of a contract. In particular, we advance
the state of the art in the following ways. First, we delineate and computation-
ally model context information, confidence measures, and risk in agent inter-
actions. Second, we show how a measure of trust can be derived from the
latter concepts and reputation information. Finally, we show how the trust
measure can guide the choice of interaction parties, the stance that is taken
during negotiation, and the issues that need to be agreed upon in a contract.
THE TRUST MODEL
In this section, we describe the trust model.
2 We first give the basic defini-
tions that we will use in the rest of the paper. Using these definitions, we
model confidence, reputation, and norms. We then show how to combine
these measures to compute appropriate trust values.
Basic Notions
Let Ag be the society of agents noted as a;b;...2 Ag. A particular group
of agents is noted as G   Ag and each agent can only belong to one group.
3
Groups can be ordered in terms of the power relationships that hold between
them. This captures the notion of authority that one group may hold over
another one. The power relationship is modeled as a total pre-order on the
groups. Thus, if Gi has at least as much power as Gj, this is noted as
Gi  p Gj. We conceive that agents within each group have a set of similar
norms (e.g., all retailers in the U.K. agree to a 14-day return policy on all
items they sell or all retailers in Spain close on Sunday). s denotes a totally
ordered set of time points (sufficiently large to account for all agent interac-
tions) noted as t0;t1;..., such that ti > tj if and only if i > j.
Contracts
Contracts are agreements about issues and the values these issues should
have. Let X ¼f x1;x2;...;xng be the set of potential issues to include in
a contract, and the domain of values taken by an issue x be noted as Dx
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will note that issue x takes the value t 2 Dx as x ¼ t. Thus, a particular
contract, O, is an arbitrary set of issue-value assignments noted as
O¼f x1 ¼ t1; x2 ¼ t2; ...;xn ¼ tng, where xi 2 X;ti 2 Dxi We denote by O
thesetofpotentialcontracts.Wewillalsonotethesetofissuesinvolvedincon-
tract O as XðOÞ X. Given an agreed contract, two or more agents all have a
subset of the contract to enact. Each subset of the contract allocated to an
agent is superscripted by the respective agent identifier such that, for example,
in a contract O between a and b; Oa [ Ob ¼ O. An agent, a, has a utility func-
tion for contracts, noted as Ua :O!½ 0;1 ; and for each issue x 2 XðOÞ in a
contract noted as Ua
x : Dx !½ 0;1 . In this work, we will define the utility of
a contract, for an agent, as a weighted aggregation of the utilities of the indi-
vidual issues as shown next (note this assumes that issues are independent):
UaðOÞ¼Rx2XðOÞ
xx:Ua
xðtxÞ, where Rxx ¼ 1 and tx 2 Dx is the value taken
by the issue x 2 XðOÞ. We also define a similarity function for an issue x as
Simx : Dx   Dx !½ 0;1 , which determines how similar two values for the
sameissueare.Suchafunctionisrequiredtohavethefollowingtwoproperties
(i)Simxðt;tÞ¼1(i.e.,reflexivity)and(ii)Simxðt1; t2Þ¼Simxðt2;t1Þ(i.e,sym-
metry). A global similarity function over contracts Sim can also be applied
over two contracts having the same issues by aggregating the similarity values
of each issue in each contract such that: SimðO;O0Þ¼Rx2XðOÞ¼XðO0Þxx   Simx
ðtx;t0
xÞ; where wx is the weight of issue x and Rwx ¼ 1. The weight wx can be
the same as those used in the utility function so that contracts deemed similar
also have similar utilities for the agent concerned.
We consider that agents, whether from the same group or from different
groups, invariably interact within some electronic institution (Esteva et al.
2001) which specifies and (or) restricts (some) issue-value assignments of con-
tracts through a set of norms (see the next sub-section). Naturally, each
institution may also specify different rules.
Rules Dictating Expected Issue-Value Assignments
The agreed contract provides a clear statement of what is expected with
respect to each issue. However, the social setting in which the interaction
takes place may also give rise to expectations which are not explicitly stated
in the contract itself. For example, a buyer agent a from country A might
expect seller agent b from country B to deliver goods nicely wrapped in gift
paper as opposed to in a carton box. This clause may not have been specified
in the contract as it is a norm in the client’s group that goods must be nicely
wrapped. Thus, at execution time, an agent may fail to satisfy another’s
(contracted or not) expectations because (i) it is not able to meet the expecta-
tions, (ii) it is not willing to meet the expectations, or (iii) it is not aware of the
unspecified expectations. In any case, the satisfaction or not of these expecta-
tions directly impacts on the trust the agent has in its opponent (Molm et al.
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may not be modified, but this is not considered here.
Against this background, we take into account the three basic sets of
norms
4 that can be sources of unspecified expectations
5: (i) social rules, noted
as SocRules, that all agents in the society Ag possess in common, (ii) group
rules, noted as GroupRules (G), that all agents within a particular group
G Ag have in common, and (iii) institutional rules, noted as InstRules, that
agents a and b interacting within a particular electronic institution must
abide by. In the case of group rules, there is no guarantee that agents from
different groups, having different norms, will satisfy their interaction part-
ner’s group rules. On the other hand, the conclusions of institutional rules
are guaranteed by the institution (e.g., price p has to be paid, seller has to give
goods). This guarantee is normally specified through a penalty which must be
paid (by the rule breaker) if the rule is not respected. In more detail, rules of
all types allow an agent to infer expected issue-value assignments from a con-
tract. Here the rules will be written in the following way: IF x1 ¼ t1 and
x2 ¼ t2 and ... and xm ¼ tm Then x ¼ t, meaning that if (xi ¼ ti) 2 O for
all i ¼ 1, ..., m, then issue x’s value is expected to be equal to t. An example
of such a rule would be: IF price ¼ £100 and qos ¼ 8 Then anti-DoS ¼ 10,
which means that the if the price of the an telecommunication line (bought
from some Internet Service Provider [ISP]) is a hundred pounds, and the
quality of service guarantee (qos) of the ISP is eight (i.e., high in this context),
then it is expected that the ISP will provide an anti denial-of-service (DoS) on
the line. We assume that x does not appear in the premise of the rule (other-
wise this could lead to some rules being unsatisfiable). We note by Rules the
set of all possible rules written using the above syntax
6 over the set X of issues
and corresponding domains of values. The rules an agent abides by will
depend on the group it belongs to and the other rules implied by the insti-
tution within which it is interacting with others.
Given a contract O proposed by a to b, where a2G1 and b2G2, we can
now devise the set of all of a’s (or b’s) expectations (unspecified and specified)
about the values of the issues in the contract. The unspecified expectations
due to the social setting, Oa
exp, of issue-value assignments from O is the set
of all conclusions of the rules of agent a, Rules (a) ¼ SocRules[Group Rules
(G1) and InstRules (that apply to a and b), that have their premise satisfied by
the equalities in the contract O. The complete expanded contract from a’s
point of view is therefore defined as Oa
þ ¼ O [ Oa
exp (the latter will be differ-
ent from b’s expanded contract, O
b
þ,i fb’s group has different rules that apply
to the issues of O).
The issues contained in the expanded contract may vary (for the same
contract O), depending on the group and institutional rules that apply at
the time the agents make an agreement. This is because an agent may interact
under different institutions (having different institutional norms) or an agent
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(power) from its original group. Given the expanded contract, an agent
may then decide to trust its opponent depending on its prior knowledge of
its opponent’s performance. In the following text we model this in more detail.
Interaction History and Context
In order to try and predict the future performance of an agent, it is
important to analyze its interaction history in terms of both the outcomes
of interactions and the norms that prevailed in each past interaction. In more
detail, the interaction history of an agent a, intending to interact with an
agent b, can be viewed as consisting of a list of elements with four main com-
ponents: (i) a’s agreed contract O with b and the outcome of the enactment of
the contract O0 by b and a (i.e., a list of pairs of (O, O0) form the contracting
history), (ii) Rules(a) that a had to abide by for the contract (at time ti when
the contract was signed), (iii) InstRules that both a and b had to abide by in a
given institution, and (iv) a’s utility function (at time ti) for the contract issues
for which it hired b. Each element in an interaction history is therefore repre-
sented as: ci ¼h a;b;O;O0;fUa
xgx2XðOÞ; RulesðaÞ;InstRules;tii, and the inter-
action history as CB ¼ {c1, c2...}. We will note by CBa,b   CB, the history
containing all interactions between a and b.
For each new interaction between a and b, a will need to consider the inter-
action history as well as the currently prevailing rules and its current utility func-
tion in order to predict the behavior of b (as will be shown later). Thus we define
as a’s current context
7 within which a new contract isn e g o t i a t e dw i t ha na g e n tb
a n de x e c u t e da st h es e t :Ra;b ¼h CBa;b;fUa
xgx2X; RulesðaÞ;tci,w h e r etc repre-
sents the current time. We assume that the agents will have agreed between them
(through negotiation or by one partner imposing the institutional rules) which
institution will guide their interactions and this will imply a given set of rules
InstRules applying over the interaction.
8
Every time a new contract is agreed and enacted, it is added as a new
element to CB in order to update the context of the agent. Moreover, all the
rules, including the InstRules,w i l lb er e c o r d e di nt h ei n t e r a c t i o nh i s t o r ya f t e r
the interaction is completed. Thus, this context can be dynamic for a number
of reasons (apart from the history being updated with new elements). First, an
agent may change groups such that its group rules might change and, conse-
quently, so will its expectations. Second, an agent may interact with the same
partners within different institutions (e.g., buying from a seller in England and
buying from the same seller in Spain where different trade rules or laws apply).
Third, the interacting agents might change their utility functions over time such
that they value an issue differently at different points in time (e.g., a travel
package may be worth more in summer than in winter).
9
In the following sections, we use information derived from the context in
order to define and evaluate the agent’s trust in its opponent’s enactment of
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personal knowledge about an agent (confidence) and that derived from infor-
mation about the agent gathered from other agents in the society (repu-
tation). In the next section, we focus on defining confidence (i.e., the
personal aspect of trust) and later combine it with reputation (which is based
on the confidence of other agents) to get an overall notion of trust.
Confidence
We will define confidence as follows: a’s confidence is an issue x handled
by b is a measure of certainty (leading to trust), based on evidence from past
direct interactions with b, which allows a to expect a given set of utility devi-
ation values to be achieved by b for x.
10
Thus if a has a high degree of confidence with respect to x being well
enacted or not by b, then the interval of utility deviation values expected
by a and b will be relatively small (conversely the set is large if confidence
is low). This set of utility deviation values may bring more utility than
expected (i.e., a high confidence in b being ‘‘good’’) or less utility than
expected (i.e., a high confidence in b being ‘‘bad’’). We initially consider con-
fidence on a per-issue basis given that agents may be more reliable in satisfy-
ing some issues than others. These measures of imprecision on an opponent’s
behavior are not strictly probabilistic in nature since they may involve a sub-
jective appreciation of performance as well (e.g., how ‘‘bad’’ or ‘‘good’’ the
delivery time of goods is for a buyer might not be precisely defined and this
perception might also vary over time depending on the agent’s preferences).
Given this, we choose a fuzzy set-based approach to relate confidence levels
with expected utility deviations for issues.
Confidence Levels
In this work, the behavior of an agent regarding the fulfillment of a term
(i.e., an issue-value pair) in a contract is perceived in terms of the variations
on utility between the signed value for the issue and the enacted one. These
utility variations are then sensed over multiple interactions to build a picture
of the agent’s performance over time. Here, we take the stance that fuzzy sets
have their domains specified over ‘‘absolute’’ variations on utility DU, rather
than on relative variations (i.e., relative to the utility of the value signed for
the issue).
11 Thus, we consider that DU 2½   1;1  (recall that utility values
belong to the interval [0,1]).
Specifically, we assume that agents share a (small) set L¼f L1;L2;...;
Lkg of linguistic labels to qualify the performance of an agent on each issue.
In what follows, we will use the basic set L¼{Bad, Average, Good}. We
believe these labels provide an adequate means for an agent to express its
view on the possible (approximate) utility deviations, gains, or losses, in the
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values. For example, each agent could understand the labels ‘‘Bad,’’ ‘‘Aver-
age,’’ and ‘‘Good’’ for the issue ‘‘delivery’’ in different ways according to
their ontology (as shown in Table 1).
12 Thus, using Table 1, agent a can
translate a ‘‘Very Late’’ rating from an agent b as Late (since they both
equate to ‘‘Bad’’) and ‘‘Right time’’ from c as ‘‘On time’’ (since they both
equate to ‘‘Average’’). In more detail, we model the meaning of a label L
by a fuzzy set on the domain of utility deviations DU ¼½   1;1 , specified
by its membership function lLðuÞ : ½ 1;1 !½ 0;1 . Examples of membership
functions
13 for the above set of labels are given in Figure 1.
Thus, agent a’s confidence level is defined as the membership level, mea-
sured over [0,1], of the behavior of a particular agent b with respect to an
issue x to a linguistic term L, noted as Cða;b;x;LÞ. In the remainder of the
paper, we will avoid the agent identifier(s) wherever this is unambiguously
defined by the context. Therefore, the cut of the fuzzy set defined by
Cðx;LÞ represents a range (on the horizontal axis) of values, EDUcðx;LÞ¼
fdu 2½   1;1 jlLðduÞ Cðx;LÞg, that is understood as the range of
expected utility deviations at execution time on issue x by agent b. For
instance, a may express its belief that b is ‘‘Good’’ to a confidence level 0.6
in fulfilling the contractual values on price, ‘‘Average’’ to a level of 0.25,
and ‘‘Bad’’ to a level of 0. This would mean that a expects the utility devi-
TABLE 1 Possible Different Meanings of the Labels for Three Agents When
Applied to the Issue ‘‘Delivery’’
Label=Agent ab c
Bad Late Very late Too late
Average On time Just in time Right time
Good Early Very early Early enough
FIGURE 1 Shapes of membership functions in different labels and ranges supporting confidence levels in
‘‘Good’’ (0.6), ‘‘Average’’ (0.25) and ‘‘Bad’’ (0). The shaded region indicates the range over which the sets
‘‘Good’’ and ‘‘Average’’ intersect. The base of this shaded region is the set of expected values of DU.
840 S. D. Ramchurn et al.ation to lie within the range of valueswhichsupporttheconfidencelevelof0.6
for ‘‘Good,’’ 0.25 for ‘‘Average,’’ and 0 for ‘‘Bad.’’ This is shown on Figure 1.
Evaluating Confidence
In order to obtain confidence levels for different labels, we first need to
calculate the range of utility variations expected in the issue. This expected
range can be obtained by considering the utility changes that have been
observed in past interactions.
14 While the size of samples of DUx will nat-
urally determine the accuracy of the model, the temporal range of samples
taken (i.e., a window over the latest interactions) will determine how up-
to-date the model is in determining the current nature of the opponent.
Therefore, we propose two ways of eliciting the confidence level from a prob-
ability distribution that minimize computational complexity. The first con-
siders using the confidence interval of a normal distribution,
15 while the
second uses a time dependent mean.
Therefore, given a context Ra,b and a proposed (not yet agreed) contract
O, for each issue x in X(O), we can estimate, from the history of past inter-
actions, a probability distribution P of a’s utility variation DUx 2½   1;1 
(negative or positive) relative to issue x (we will avoid the agent identifier
in the utility function since this is clear from the context). Values of DUx cor-
respond to the possible differences between the utility Ua
xðtÞ of the agreed
value (x ¼ t)2O and the utility Ua
xðt0Þ of the (unknown) final value (x ¼ t0)
in the executed contract O0 (i.e., DUx ¼ Ua
xðt0Þ Ua
xðtÞ). Then we can say
that the agent a has a certain risk with issue x when it estimates that
1 q > 0 where q is the probability that DUx < 0. Of course, the more nega-
tive the mean, DUx, of this probability distribution (i.e., the higher the
expected utility loss), the higher the risk, and the more positive this mean
is, the lower the risk (i.e., the lower the expected utility loss).
Thus, to calculate the confidence levels in each of the issues concerned,
we first need to estimate the probability distribution of P. This has to be
done both for those issues x appearing in O and those in the expanded con-
tract Oþ ¼ O[Oexp, resulting from the application of the rules in the current
context. We have to do so analogously with the contracts in the precedent
cases of the interaction history CB of the current context. However, if we
assume that the proposed contract is signed such that the norms of the
institution InstRules under which the agents (a and b) are operating are
fully enforced (i.e., penalties, matching the utility loss on an issue, have to
be paid by the agent which does not respect the norms which regiment the
performance on the issue), then the risk is zero
16 for those (groups of)
issue-value assignments insured by institutional norms. This is the case even
though the inference from previous interactions may suggest that the agent
would defect. In such cases, we remove all these insured issues from the
analysis. In the same way, if in an element of the interaction history, an
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interacted at the time, we remove it from the sample of elements being
analyzed for that issue. This procedure avoids us incrementing trust when
an institution has guaranteed good behavior in the past (since risk is zero
in such cases).
In cases where the interacting agents have made contracts with very
different values (e.g., trading a car involves more utility transfer than trading
a phone), it might be important to assess the history given the similarity
of past cases. This prevents an agent from building trust using low valued
transactions in order to be trusted on high value transactions which it can
defect from in order to reap a large profit (e.g., on eBay [Resnick and
Zeckhauser 2002]). To this end, the similarity functions introduced earlier
can be used to filter the cases which are most relevant to the current contract
O as follows:
CBSa;bðO;xÞ¼ c 2 CBa;b




ðx ¼ tÞ2O;ðx ¼ t0Þ2O1;







where CBSa,b (O, x) is the set of cases to consider in the assessment of b’s
behavior with respect to x on a given contract. The rule above selects those
cases for which the similarity level of the contracts, as well as the similarity of
values for that issue, are above certain thresholds kO2[0,1] and kx2[0,1].
Now, assume we have defined the probability distribution P (obtained
from CBSa,b(O, x)). From this distribution, different techniques (detailed
later in this section) can be used to elicit a significantly representative interval
[d1, d2] for DU from which the confidence level can be obtained. To calculate
confidence levels C(x, L) for each label L2L, we want the interval [d1, d2]t o
coincide as much as possible with the set of expected values EDUc(x). Since
this range is defined by the confidence levels of its limits, the procedure
amounts to selecting the minimum confidence levels of the two limits for that
label as: C(x, L) ¼ min(lL(d1), lL(d2)). We propose two ways to obtain the
interval [d1, d2]:
1. Find the 95% (or higher) confidence interval of the mean of the distri-
bution such that the probability that (d1   DUx   d2) is equal to 0.95.
This involves first approximating the distribution to a normal distribution
by calculating the estimated sample variance ^ r r
2 of the distribution as well
as the mean. Then the confidence interval can be obtained from the fol-
lowing equation: DUx  
^ r r lconf ﬃﬃﬃ
N
p , where lconf ¼ 1.96 for a 95% confidence
and N is the sample size.
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wi  ð Ua
xðtÞ Ua
xðtiÞÞ
where ci ¼h a;b;O;O0;fUa
xgx2XðOÞ;RulesðaÞ;InstRules;tii t is the value
taken by x2X(O) and ti is the value taken by x2X(O0) and wi ¼
Simxðt;tiÞ qðtc;tiÞ
Rcj2CBa;bSimxðt;tjÞ qðtc;tjÞ. In the latter expression, tc is the current time and
q:Time Time![0,1] is a time-weighing function which weighs the most
recent contracts with a larger value. An instance of the time-weighting
function is q ¼ sinðp
2   ti
tcÞ where ti is the time at which case i was recorded
and tc is the current time. Thus, d1 represents an expected value for the
enacted contract given most cases with similar values for issue x (to the
current value) as well as the most recent cases are given more importance
in the evaluation of the mean.
We will assume that all agents in the society are able to evaluate their confi-
dence in issues handled by their opponents and may transmit these measures
to others. The transmission of such confidence then gives rise to the concept
of reputation, which is described next and later combined with personal con-
fidence measures.
Reputation
An agent’s reputation is the perception of a group or groups of agents in
the society about its abilities and attributes (Dasgupta 1998; Sabater and
Sierra 2002). Several models of reputation have been developed to show
how an agent can build up its trust in another by retrieving and aggregating
information about the latter from other agents (e.g., [Yu and Singh 2002;
Sabater and Sierra 2002; Zacharia and Maes 2000]). Thus, here we do not
consider how this reputation information is gathered from the other agents
in the society as there already exists several techniques to do this efficiently.
Rather, we assume this information is simply available from a social network
that structures the knowledge that each agent has of its neighbors and keeps
track of past interactions (Sabater and Sierra 2002). This allows us to focus
on representing reputation and combining it with confidence (as shown in the
next sub-section) In this work, we specialize the definition of reputation to the
following: a’s estimate of b’s reputation in handling an issue x is a’s measure
to certainty (leading to trust), based on the aggregation of confidence
measures (for x) provided to it by other agents which have previously
interacted with b which allows a to expect a given set of values to be achieved
by b for x.
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Ag X L![0,1] where Rep(b, x, L) represents a’s view of agent b’s repu-
tation in handling issue x with respect to the qualifying label L (the name of
the agent(s) will be omitted when the context unambiguously determines it).
We also assume that the labels L2L have their domain specified over the
same range of utility deviations (i.e., DU 2½   1;1  as explained earlier.
The reputation function generally aggregates confidence levels obtained
from other agents in the environment (Sabater and Sierra 2002).
17 Here we
connect to the REGRET reputation model by using the witness reputation.
18
The latter defines the reputation of an agent b as a sum of the confidence
levels from other agents in the environment who have interacted in the past
with b. Moreover, given our modeling of the society of agents in terms of
groups and the power relationship holding between them, we use this power
relationship to weigh the confidence levels sent (rather than using trust values
as in REGRET). Thus, if group G1 has more power than group G2, then
more weight is given to confidence levels transmitted from agents in group
G1 than to those from agents in G2. This is because it is assumed that those
agents that come from high power groups (e.g., legal institutions, govern-
ment) have more credibility than those in low power groups (e.g., small
companies, individuals). The witness reputation is therefore calculated by
taking the minimum rating sent by agents in each group as: Repðb;x;LÞ¼
RGi2G;a62Giwi   minc2GiCðc;b;x;LÞ where wi > wj iff Gi  pGj.
As can be seen, reputation measures can be particularly useful to an agent
that enters a system for the first time. This is because the agent would not
have interacted with any other agents in its environment in the past. There-
fore, it would not be possible for it to compute its confidence in them. Thus it
can only use information that is supplied to it by other agents in the environ-
ment. However, such information may be liable to noise or may not be true if
agents are lying. Also if no one else has interacted with an agent’s opponent,
then the agent can only take a guess at its opponent’s reliability. In such cir-
cumstances, the agent can only learn from its direct interactions with other
agents and compute its confidence measures from these interactions.
Given the above, using just confidence or just reputation values to compute
the set of expected values for a given issue is often only useful in extreme situa-
tions. In the next section, we devise a measure that caters for all situations
between these extremes and then after that we derive a trust measure from this.
Combined Confidence and Reputation Measures
Generally speaking, we consider that both confidence and reputation should
betakenintoaccountinordertocomeupwithasetofexpectedvaluesforanissue.
We rely on a combination of both measures in order to balance both the societal
viewonanopponentandthepersonalviewoftheagentuntilthelattercanbesure
844 S. D. Ramchurn et al.that its own view is more accurate. To come to this conclusion, each agent will
haveitsownthresholdonthenumberofinteractionsneededtohavethisaccurate
measure. Therefore, given agent a’s context Ra;b;hCBa;b;fUa
xgx2X;RulesðaÞ;tci,
here we propose to define the threshold j as j ¼ maxð1;jCBa;bj=hminÞ;
where jCBa;bj, is the number of interactions of a with b and h min is the minimum
number of interactions (successful negotiations and completed executions
19)
above which only the direct interaction is taken into account (Sabater and Sierra
2002).
Thus, we capture the combination of confidence and reputation measures
through the function CR : Ag   X  L!½ 0;1 , which is, in the simplest
case, a weighted average of both kinds of degrees (as in the previous cases
we omit references to the agent whenever possible):
CRðb;x;LÞ¼j   Cðb;x;LÞþð 1   jÞ Repðb;x;LÞð 1Þ
Given CR levels it is then possible to compute the expected values for an issue
x and label L as: EDUcrðb;x;LÞ¼f ujlx
LðuÞ CRðb;x;LÞg, and then the
intersection of the expected ranges for all the labels L2L is:
EDUcrðb;xÞ¼\ L2LEDUcrðx;LÞ.
The assignment of CR values for all labels may not always be consistent
(i.e., EDUcr (b, x, L) ¼; ). This could happen, for example, if the agents in the
environment do not hold the same view on one of their members (such that
Rep(b, x, L) does not define a consistent range). Our solution to this problem
is the following: Whenever the intersection results in an empty set, we will
iteratively not consider the label with the lowest confidence level, until a
non-null range of values is obtained. This procedure equates to removing
those decision variables that have the lowest importance in the set under con-
sideration. Our solution ensures that a consistent intersection can be found in
all possible cases.
As can be seen, the above range is defined in terms of the utility devia-
tions rather than in terms of the values that the issue could take. However,
at negotiation time, for example (as will be seen later), we might need to com-
pute the expected values an issue could take, after execution of the contract,
given an offered value t0 for the issue. This requires transfering the expected
utility deviations to the domain of the issue considered.
20 This can be com-
puted in the following way:




In our trust model, we use the combined degrees {CR(b, x, L)}L2L,
as given by Eq. 1, to define the interval of expected values EDUcr(b,x) that
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cr
lossðxÞ¼supðEDUcrðb;xÞÞ.
This maximum expected utility loss represents the risk that is involved in the
interaction given knowledge acquired both from direct interactions and repu-
tation and also from the norms of the environment. While the risk describes
how much we expect to lose from an interaction, trust is the opposite of this
given our initial definition. Thus we define trust as: Tðb;xÞ¼minð1;1 
D
cr
lossðxÞÞ, where where T serves to describe trust in b for issue x based on
both confidence in b and its reputation with respect to issue x.
Here, we choose to bound trust values
21 in the range [0,1], where 0 repre-
sents a completely untrustworthy agent (and corresponds to the maximum
possible utility loss) and 1 represents a completely trustworthy agent (and
corresponds to zero utility loss).
22
In any case, we can now define the trust T(b,X(O)) of an agent a is an
agent b over a particular set X(O) ¼ {x1,...,xk} of issues appearing in the
contract O (or in the expanded one Oþ as an aggregation of the trust in each
individual issue (e.g., trust in delivering on time, paying on time, and the pro-
duct having the quality specified in the contract). That is, we postulate T(b,
X(O) ¼ agg(T(bx1),...,T(b,xk)), where agg: [0, 1]
k![0, 1] is a suitable aggre-
gation function.
23 If some issues are considered to be more important than
others, the aggregation function should take this into consideration. This
can be achieved by means of different weights given for each issue xi2X(O)
(the higher the weight, the more important the issue). A typical choice would
be to take the aggregation




wi   Tðb;xiÞð 3Þ
where Rwi ¼ 1 and 0  wi 1.
TRUST IN PRACTICE
Trust models are not useful in their own right. Rather they need to be
coupled with an agent’s decision model such that the agent is able to perform
some of its tasks better. In our model, when an agent, say a, has a particular
task to contract for, it will decide on the issues to be negotiated and identify
possible interaction partners, say fb1;b2;...;bpg Ag. For each agent in
this set, we can calculate the trust value for each issue (i.e., T(b, x)) and
aggregate these to give a general trust value for each agent (using Eq. 3). That
is, Tðb1;X0Þ;Tðb2;X0Þ;...;Tðbp;X0Þ, where X0   X is the set of issues under
consideration. Trust can thus provide an ordering of the agents in terms of
their overall reliability for a proposed contract. Agent a can then easily
choose the preferred agent or the set of agents it would want to negotiate
with (i.e., by choosing the most trustworthy one(s)).
846 S. D. Ramchurn et al.In addition, however, we use trust to influence the negotiation that takes
place before an agreement is signed. In this way, trust can directly influence
the quality of agreements reached and the efficiency of the negotiation. First,
the expected range used to obtain the trust value is instead used to change the
range of negotiable values of a particular issue. Second, trust is used to
change the number of issues to be negotiated.
Re-defining Negotiation Intervals
At contracting time, issue-value assignments, x ¼ t, are agreed upon.
Agents accept values that lie within a range [tmin, tmax], such that
Ua
xðtminÞ > 0 and Ua
xðtmaxÞ > 0. This interval is the acceptable range that
an agent uses to offer and counter offer (according to a strategy) during
negotiation (Jennings et al. 2001). Moreover, given a potential issue-value
assignment x ¼ t0 in an offer, an agent can compute an interval of expected
values. Thus, using Eq. 2, we have EVcr(b, x, t0) ¼ [et
 , et
þ] over which the
value t0 actually obtained after execution is likely to vary. This range defines
the uncertainty in the value of the issue and if the acceptable range [et
 , et
þ]
does not fit within [tmin, tmax], there exists the possibility that the final value
may lie outside the acceptable region. This, in turn, means that Ua
xðt0Þ may be
zero, which is clearly undesirable and irrational.
Given this information, the agent can strategically restrict the negotiation
interval [tmin, tmax] with respect to the set of expected values [et
 , et
þ]a s
shown in the following. To do this, we first define the set of possible con-
tracts, Ox, that are consistent with the expected values of x and its acceptance
range, and then define the corrected values for tmin and tmax:
t0
min ¼ infftjðx ¼ tÞ2O;O 2 Oxg and t0
max ¼ supftjðx ¼ tÞ2O;O 2 Oxg
where
O¼f Ojðx ¼ tÞ2O;EVcrðb;x;tÞ ½ tmin;tmax g
This will shrink the range of negotiable values for an issue (i.e., from [tmin,
tmax]t o[ t0
min, t0
max], where either t0
min tmin or t0
max tmax, depending on
which of the two limits t0
min and t0
max gives higher utility respectively) to
ensure that the final outcome will fit within the range [tmin, tmax]. As well
as reducing the possibility that the executed value will lie outside the
acceptable range, reducing the negotiation range can also bring some other
added benefits. It can help the agent reduce the time to negotiate over the
value of each issue (e.g., if the range is smaller, the number of possible offers
is also smaller) and it can help the agent to make better decisions that depend
on the negotiation outcome (e.g., if a seller is expected to deliver goods one
Devising A Trust Model 847day later than the agreed three days, the buyer can adjust its other tasks to fit
with delivery in four days).
Extending the Set of Negotiable Issues
Initially, we argued that higher trust could reduce the negotiation
dialogue and lower trust could increase the number of issues negotiated
over. In this section, we deal with this particular use of trust in defining
the issues that need to be negotiated. To this end, issues not explicitly
included in a contract O
a may receive an expected value through one of
the rules in Rules(a) for an agent a: r: If x1 ¼ t1 and x2 ¼ t2 and ...xm ¼ tm
Then x ¼ t.
Thus, if the premise of such a rule is true in a contract, the issue x is
expected to have the value t. If, however, the trust in the agent fulfilling the
values of the issues present in the premises is not very high, it means that
the agent believes that the values t1, t2, ..., tn may not be eventually satisfied.
In such a case, to ensure that the issue x actually receives value t,i ts h o u l db e
added to the negotiated terms of the contract. This means that, when the trust
is low in the premises, the unspecified issues (as discussed earlier) are added to
the contracted issues in order to try and ensure that they will be met (whereas if
trsut is high the issue is not negotiated). For example, if a buyer believes that
the quality of a product to be delivered (the premise of a rule) will not be the
quality of the product actually delivered, the buyer might request that the
product satisfies very specific standards (e.g., kitemark or CE), which it pri-
vately expected and would not normally specify in a contract if trust were high.
Formally, this means that if T(b, Xr) threshold, (where (T(b, Xr)i s
defined as per Eq. 3 and Xr is the set of issues in the premise of rule r), then
the issue x in the conclusion of the rule should be added to the set of contract
terms. On the other hand, as an agent becomes more confident that its inter-
action partner is actually performing well on the issues in the contract, it
might eventually be pointless negotiating on the issue if the premises of the
issue presuppose that the value expected will actually be obtained. This is,
if T(b, Xr) >threshold, then the issue x in the conclusion of the rule can be
removed from the set of contract terms.
The two processes described here serve to expand and shrink the space of
negotiation issues. For a new entrant to the system, for example, the trust
value others have in it are likely to be low and hence the number of issues
negotiated over will be large. But, as it acquires the trust of others, the
number of issues it would need to negotiate will go down. Ultimately, with
more trust, the set of negotiable issues can thus be reduced to a minimal
set, affording shorter negotiation dialogues. Conversely, with less trust, the
negotiable issues expand, trading off the length of dialogues with higher
expected utility.
848 S. D. Ramchurn et al.CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
In this paper, we have discussed the necessary components to build up a
concrete computational trust model based on direct and indirect multi-agent
interactions. We have instantiated context, risk, and confidence values using
rules that apply over the issues negotiated in a contract. From these compo-
nents a measure of trust has been developed. Moreover, we have shown the
worth of our model by describing how it can directly guide an agent’s deci-
sions in (i) choosing interaction partners, (ii) devising the set of negotiable
issues, and (iii) determining negotiation intervals. The latter enable an agent
to reduce time spent in negotiation dialogues, choose more reliable contrac-
tors, and adapt the negotiation strategy to each contractor. These are not
possible using current trust models.
Future work will focus on studying and refining the properties of the
model for both cooperative and competitive settings through simulations.
Also, we aim to investigate modifications to the model to take into account
relative utility variations. Finally, the trust measure will be made more sensi-
tive to the stance taken by an opponent during the negotiation dialogue (e.g.,
if the opponent provided arguments backing its reliability).
NOTES
1. Risk is here defined as the maximum (utility) loss an agent can expect
given an opponent reneges on its commitments in a given interaction
(Marsh 1994; Zeckhauser and Viscusi 1990).
2. We build upon our work in Ramchurn et al. (2003).
3. If G denotes a partition fG1; G2; ...; Gig of the society of agents into
non-empty groups, then for all Gi;Gj;2G ;Gi [ Gj ¼; ;\iGi ¼ Ag:
4. We believe these are the necessary, rather than sufficient, sets of norms
that can give rise to unspecified expectations. Other sets of norms could
arise from agents creating them or from legal systems, for example.
5. Norms can be of a very complex nature. However, in this paper, we oper-
ationalize norms in the form of constraints that apply over the values of
issues in a contract and foresee using richer representations of norms in
future work.
6. Richer syntaxes could also be thought of for premises in these rules,
allowing for predicates like  ; ;6¼, but equality (¼) will suffice for
the purposes of this paper.
7. Again, we consider these features as necessary rather than sufficient.
More features could be added (e.g., social relationships existing between
agents or reasons given by an agent explaining its poor performance) and
their impact will be investigated in future work.
Devising A Trust Model 8498. We do not specify the institutional rules as part of the context since the
decision to choose an institution is not defined by the context. However,
these rules need to be specified before an agent is able to calculate its trust
in its opponent. Depending on the level of trust, the opponent may then
be chosen as an interaction partner (as will be shown later).
9. By taking into account such a dynamic context in evaluating trust, the
model aims to adapt to cases where the environment and the agent are
not necessarily static.
10. Our definition of confidence generally caters to a variety techniques that
could be used to derive confidence values. In future work, we aim to
define more explicit semantics of confidence values and enrich our defi-
nition of confidence.
11. The model can be made to work on relative deviations by making simple
modifications to the fuzzy sets and the technique used to elicit confidence
levels. This will be investigated in future work.
12. We also assume that the translation between the common and the specific
terms is private. However, we do require that the common terms have the
same agreed upon interpretations among the agents in order to permit a
meaningful communication of reputation values.
13. The shape of the membership function given only serves as an example.
Arbitrarily complex functions can be used in reality.
14. There are several techniques to model this range using probability distri-
butions given the size of samples of DUx that can be obtained from the
interaction history (e.g., binomial, normal, or poisson distributions).
Moreover, the behavior of the agent could also be modeled as a time-ser-
ies so as to predict its behavior over future time points or analyzed using
other data-mining techniques (e.g., cluster analysis, neural networks).
However, the more complex the analysis, the more time and memory
the algorithm will need to devise a level of confidence.
15. The type of probability distribution is not central to the trust model we
wish to devise, provided it is continuous, and there are techniques to esti-
mate the mean and variance given a small sample of values (since the
agent’s interactions will certainly not generate the infinite number of sam-
ples=points required to model a distribution accurately).
16. This assumes that the institution fully insures against any losses. This
assumption could be removed and a risk level determined according to
the institutional rules as well.
17. We are therefore implicitly assuming that all these measures are commen-
surate (i.e., have the same meaning and are based on the same scale), and
hence their aggregation make sense.
18. We could also use other reputation measures provided by REGRET,
such as neighborhood or system reputation. We intend to explore these
measures and others in future work.
850 S. D. Ramchurn et al.19. It is important to specify that only those completed interactions should be
taken into account since only these can give us information about the
behavior of the opponent in its execution of contracts. Negotiations could
end up in no agreements and these should be excluded when counting
interactions in the case base.
20. By using utility variations, rather than value variations, we can use the
same membership functions even if the utility function changes over time.
21. We acknowledge that other bounds may be applied in other trust models
(e.g., [ 1,1] as in Marsh[1994] or [0, 1] in eBay). See Marsh (1994) for a
wider discussion on the meaning of the bounds on the rating.
22. Our choice for the bounds of [0, 1] serves to simplify the analysis when
normalizing all trust ratings in issues and over contracts.
23. Generally, an aggregation function is monotonic such that minðu1;...;
ukÞ gðu1;...;ukÞ maxðu1;...;ukÞ (see [Calvo et al. 2002] for a
survey).
24. While most aggregation operators are defined parametrically with respect
to weights assigned to each component to be aggregated, more sophisti-
cated aggregation models (based, for example, on different Lebesgue,
Choquet, or Sugeno integrals) could also be used (Calvo et al. 2002).
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